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Abstract. Resource allocation in distributed systems is an exciting area
of research. Inherent properties in this environment, such as strategic
users acting selfishly and the structure of the environment within which
exchanges occur, are relevant challenges to study. This paper proposes
a market–based resource allocation in a distributed environment. Our
model has as it is objective the exploration of the effects of network
structure in the allocation of performance together with mechanisms to
improve the performance of the market. The proposed model, as well
as mechanisms to maximize the allocation of objects/goods have been
implemented and studied experimentally. The results obtained shows
that topology affects the performance of the market. Using information
propagation mechanisms clearly contributes to its improvement.
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1 Introduction
Network exchanges and markets consist of a environment containing many in-
terconnected agents interested in buying and selling objects. In many realistic
situations agents are only connected to a limited number of other agents and
unable to directly trade with all others present in the environment. Relevant
challenges in the performance of the market have to do with:
– The fact that agents are goal–oriented – quid pro quo: Often trades cannot
happen without mutual interest ([11], [2] and [3]).
– Agent needs are not detected: An efficient market requires that information
about potential sellers/buyers is dispersed among participants [4].
Therefore, an efficient market relies upon two main interrelated factors: com-
petition and information ([15], [9]). Competition arises due to the individual and
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conflicting objectives amongst the members of the market. The available infor-
mation that helps the decision–making process. These challenges can be seen
in multiple markets. From P2P networks which share content amongst peers to
people networks which share goods.
In this context, this paper is concerned with analyzing how network topolo-
gies affect the bartering processes. The analysis in particular focuses on systems
with:
– Sparse topologies (with few links per node).
– Self–interested agents (which only trade for immediate gain).
– Random networks.
– A variety of simple information propagation mechanisms ([1], [10]).
1.1 Problem Model
The model of the problem discussed here, has the following characteristics:
– The market studied is composed of nodes which offer objects.
– Nodes are located in a network and are linked to a small quantity of other
nodes.
– The links amongst nodes are static, but the nodes that form the network
have periods of being switched on and off (to simulate variable up-times of
nodes).
– Each object has a unique level of satisfaction associated with it for each
agent in the system (Level of Satisfaction - l.o.s.).
– Initially the objects are randomly assigned to nodes.
– Trades are conducted by means of bartering.
– Trades modify the global l.o.s..
– Members take only local decisions.
– Information about available objects is only available from local connections.
– Members can only trade with directly connected neighbors.
– Members only decide to trade when the trade is immediately beneficial.
– Global performance is measured as the sum of l.o.s. over all nodes.
– A steady state is achieved when no more trades are possible.
The model economy studied is captured is a Java program and with repeated
simulations we explore the effects of the degree in the performance of the market
and how the propagation of preferences and its extensions modifies the market
performance. Table 1 shows an overview of the parameters that are used in the
simulator. The simulations start with a forced step which ensures that a certain
number of nodes offers goods initially (i.e. to ensure trading begins) – without
this forced step in certain scenarios no trading would begin. [13]
1.2 The topology
The relationship amongst nodes in a market can take many different forms. The
first aim is to demonstrate that the topology, specifically the quantity of links
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Name of the parameter Value
Quantity of nodes 500
Quantity of objects 3,000
Initial objects x node 6
Average initial l.o.s. 7,000
Table 1. Simulators parameters
in the network, influences the performance of the market. In our case, we will
work with random topologies introduced by Erdo¨s and Renyi ([6], [7]).
Nodes follow rules at the instant of offering objects to the market. These
rules decide which available objects the node should offer to its neighbors. They
are influenced by the objects offered in the market. If the market, concretely the
nodes that are direct neighbors, is offering valuable objects, the node is willing
to offer its objects. When a node is connected to the rest of the nodes in the
system (i.e. fully connected topology) it has more opportunities than a node
that has a reduced number of connections. In this second case, the quantity of
neighbors will be relatively lower in relation to the first case. Thus, the fewer
neighbors that a node has, the greater the reduction in the possibility of useful
objects being offered.
1.3 Metrics Related to the Topology
The goal of the experiments is to investigate the importance of the variations in
the topology with respect to the quantity of links. Looking for this goal we vary
the topology of the network with respect to degree. Table 2 gives an overview of
the measures related to the scenarios studied. This range of scenarios allows us to
recognize when the market is affected by the lack of links. The scenarios share
the same set up. The only altered parameter has been the quantity of links.
In these scenarios the quantity of links decreases from scenario 1 to scenario
6. From scenario 1, that has a fully connected structured with 124,759, to the
scenario 6 that only has 779 links. For each scenario, a set of different network
topologies have been tested in order to verify that the results are not dependent
on a concrete wired network.
To determine the quantity of links accurately, W , required by the market,
the diameter, the average path length and the average degree in the network are
measured by each scenario. Also, in all of the scenarios, the number of unreach-
able pairs is equal to zero to ensure a graph is not disconnected. The diameter
D of a network is defined as the maximum distance amongst all distances be-
tween any pair of nodes in the network (i.e. the longest shortest path between
any pairs of nodes). The average path length L of a network is defined as the
mean distance between two nodes, averaged over all pairs of nodes (i.e. average
distance amongst reachable pairs of nodes). Finally, R is the average degree of
the network.
In order to contrast the effect that the quantity of links has on the perfor-
mance of the market, a set of scenarios where the quantity of links has been varied
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has been simulated: from a fully connected topology to a quasi non-connected
topology [14]. Table 2 shows the different scenarios and figure 1 shows the dif-
ferent scenarios using the force–directed graph layout proposed in [8].
Scenario W L D R
s1 124,759 1 1 500
s2 5,457 2.72 4 16,07
s3 3,897 2.90 4 11,47
s4 2,338 3.02 5 6,88
s5 1,559 3.57 6 4,59
s6 779 5.34 11 2,29
Table 2. Network measures
2 Simple Bartering in Random Networks
Figure 2 shows the progression of the l.o.s. in a simple bartering environment.
In this case, from time 0 to 15, the l.o.s. increases and then stops growing.
This is the period of time where the nodes have randomly assigned objects that
probably are of little interest. This could be the same situation for the rest of
the members. Many nodes with little desired objects is a fruitful interchange
scenario. But when nodes get good object, it becomes harder to offer more
advantageous objects (since what is on offer must be better than what the nodes
already have).
In scenarios 1, 2 and 3 the l.o.s. gets a value near to 7,800 points. In the
rest of the scenarios, the value obtained is far from the optimal l.o.s.. But in
scenarios where L is greater than two, some simulations have shown that no
trades are made in the market.
3 Effects of Information Propagation on Trade Diffusion
Up until now, each node has used knowledge of their neighbors to evaluate
possible exchanges of object with its neighbors. However, while some trade can
occur in which objects travel multiple hops, it is clear that sparse topologies
significantly restrict market activity. In order to explore what happens when
more information is available, applying propagation of preferences, every node
will now have a propagation list. This list contains the objects that neighbors
desire and the information will be used to make trades. The algorithm used by
the propagation of preferences can be summarized as follow:
The propagation takes the following steps:
1. Select the neighbors of a node.
(a) Send their preferences to these neighbors
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Fig. 1. Structure of the trade network from scenario 1 (i.e. fully connected) to scenario
6 (i.e. quasi non-connected).
Fig. 2. Results working without propagation. In the graphs, x–axis represents the past
of time and y–axis the l.o.s..
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(b) Arrange the list of preferences (i.e. in top positions the most
desired objects)
2. Go to 1 until all nodes have been visited in the market
Results of these simulations are shown in figure 3. In the initial time (i.e.
from time 0 to 15) behavior is similar to that of the previous case. In scenarios
1, 2 and 3, the l.o.s. is above 9,000 points. In scenario 4 the l.o.s. is near to 8,500
points. When the network has 1,559 links (i.e. scenario 5) the l.o.s. is around
7,500 points and in the scenario 6 is where the value obtained is farthest from
the optimal l.o.s.. In this case, the worst results appear when L is greater than
3. This shows that propagation begins to extend the range of trade, yet only in
a limited way.
Fig. 3. Results working with propagation. In the graphs, the x–axis represents the
passing of time and y–axis the l.o.s..
It can be seen from the simulations that using propagation of preferences,
the whole l.o.s. in the market increases. The results show that in scenarios with
a small number of links the l.o.s. is substantially reduced.
In order to improve the current results, two extensions have been imple-
mented and the results obtained from the experiments have been compared with
the original propagation. Two different extensions have been studied in relation
to the propagation of preferences:
– Extension 1: Avoiding the re–sending of preferences. In order to avoid a
neighbor re–sending duplicate preferences to the original owner, this exten-
sion re–uses that otherwise wasted space.
– Extension 2: To promote the propagation of preferences in nodes with few
links and to promote the propagation of neighbors in nodes with many links.
The idea behind this extension is to make the nodes with few links put more
wishes in the list of propagation. It gives more emphasis on the desires of
this node. With respect to nodes with many links, the extension gives more
emphasis to the preferences of its neighbors.
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Figure 4 shows the l.o.s. when the market is using propagation of preferences
based on extension 1 and extension 2. The experiments shown here, focus on sce-
narios 4, 5 and 6 as theses are the scenarios where there are significant variations
in the l.o.s.. The first column of the set is with the market using the original
propagation, the second column is the l.o.s. obtained with extension 1 and fi-
nally the last column is related to the extension 2. The results reveal that with
779 links neither extension 1 nor extension 2 work properly. The low quantity
of links makes this market a sterile market, as much for the original approach
as well as for the proposed extensions. In scenario 5 with 1,559 links, the results
using extension 2 are better than in the original and extension 1 approaches. In
scenario 4, both extensions improve the results of the original approach.
4 Discussion and Related Work
Whilst simple, the results show two things. The first is that the quantity of
links clearly has an impact on the performance of the market. In fully connected
networks, all nodes are free to trade with any node in the market. Optimal
allocations are possible amongst nodes with few trades. The drop in one–to–one
trades is less than for instances where a chain of one–to–one is necessary trades
- as occurs in very spares networks. The second is that market performance is
affected by the use of propagation of preferences. Even simple propagation can
significantly change the efficiency of the market.
The information propagated by the nodes with respect to their preferences
is used by other nodes which effectively act as mediators. A mediator is a node
that trades objects useful to others with the hope that these others accede to
make trades with the mediator. By means of these mediators the expectation
that the total quantity of trades and the l.o.s. increase are true, as is revealed
using the mechanism of propagation of preferences proposed in this paper.
Comparing the results working with and without the propagation mecha-
nisms, we can establish that the asset using propagation is relevant. To use a
propagation list has a computational cost and can also be a handicap that in
topologies with a high density of links since propagation and analysis of pref-
erence lists costs more than the relative gain. The model applied limited the
length of the preference list propagated, hence processing was still relatively
rapid - however comparison studies are needed to identify the tradeoffs between
propagation mechanisms and different topologies.
In summary, topology has a direct effect on the performance of the market.
The quality and quantity of information from one individual to another, in our
case propagation of preferences, has a positive influence on the performance of
the market.
Information diffusion is an important area with strong similarities to this
work ([12], [1], [5]). The innovation/knowledge spreads throughout a social net-
work as objects allocated in our market. But the non–rivalry property is com-
monly assumed in the information diffusion process. During the spread of knowl-
edge, the source of the information does not loose its information. In contrast, in
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Fig. 4. L.o.s. with the passing of time working with original propagation, extension 1
and extension 2.
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our approach, the object only belongs to unique members in the social network
at the same time. For this reason, when an object changes hands, the owner of
the object loses the l.o.s. associated with the object and this does not happen
in the information diffusion approach.
5 Future Work
The mechanisms studied here provide a baseline for further work and represent
simple examples of propagation techniques and lay down a starting point for
more complex mechanisms. Future work focuses on extending the two different
issues studied in this paper – topology and propagation of preferences:
– With respect to topology, the next steps are to work with other topologies,
such as scale–free and small–world topologies which are known to support
different types of propagation properties. In these cases, the effect of the
bartering need for ”double coincidences of wants” will likely have different
types of effects on the market dynamics.
– In terms of extending the propagation of preferences, work now focuses on
propagation which has longer and more directed reach across multiple nodes
in a network. An important first step that is the propagation of ownership
(who owns which objects). This provides a counterpart to demand informa-
tion which allows agents to direct their demand propagation mechanisms in
the network.
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